When Kosovo declared independence, in February 2008, it was stated that the move was not an act of self-determination. Instead, the key states that supported the decision insisted that the case for statehood arose from a unique set of circumstances. Kosovo was not a precedent; it was a sui generis case in international politics. This article considers the arguments underpinning this claim to exclusivity and argues that, taken either individually or collectively, the main justifications used to support Kosovo"s "unique" statehood -such as the abuse of human rights -in fact have serious consequences for other separatist conflicts elsewhere.
Introduction
On 19 December 2007, Sir John Sawers, the then permanent representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations made one of the most extraordinary statements of modern British diplomacy.
Emerging from a meeting of the Security Council, which had been discussing efforts to find a final status settlement for Kosovo, the diplomat stated: "You have the principle of territorial integrity. You also have the principle of self-determination. There are times when those principles are in tension with one another, and the principle of territorial integrity is qualified by the principle of self-determination." 1 This was an astounding statement. A senior British official appeared to be contradicting the longstanding principle of international relations sanctifying the territorial integrity of states, and endorsing the right of a group of people, albeit under certain conditions, to pursue secession and independence.
However, it quickly became clear that the statement was not an announcement of a revolutionary change in British foreign policy. Just days later, officials from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office made it clear that there was no change of policy whatsoever and that the esteemed ambassador had in fact misspoken. As one official explained, "we are avoiding the term self-determination at all costs." 2 Rather, the official line was that Kosovo was a unique case in international politics, deriving from the break up of Yugoslavia, the events of 1999 and the period of UN administration that followed. It could not in any way, shape or form set a precedent for others. 3 This strong reaction to the ambassador"s apparent "mistake" highlights a deep-seated and long-standing opposition to the idea of self-determination within international politics. 4 In modern terms, and certainly since the end of the Second World War, the notion of self-determination has generally been 2 British official, conversation with author, December 2007. In fact, the official stated that they were rather pleased that the specific comment had appeared to have gone "unnoticed". Certainly, it did not get any coverage in the international media at the time.
subordinated to the principle of the territorial integrity of states. Except in cases of decolonisation, or in the event of the break up of a state, the right of peoples to self-determination leading to independence has been heavily circumscribed. Instead of statehood, self-determination has been conceived of in terms of a right to self-government within the existing boundaries of a country. And so it was, originally, in the case of Kosovo. However, as this article shows, despite having argued during the 1990s that Kosovo did not have a right to independence, the United States and leading EU members eventually faced no alternative but to accept its statehood (Ker-Lindsay, 2009a) . The question then became how to do this without upsetting established principles of international law and in such a manner that would not allow it to become a precedent for other territories and groups seeking statehood. The answer was to construct the above-cited argument that Kosovo in fact represented a sui generis case in international politics. The problem is that this argument has failed to gain universal international approval. Although Kosovo has been recognised as independent by over 90 countries (as of November 2012), 5 including the United States and the majority of the European Union, its claim to statehood is still not accepted by a majority of the members of the United Nations, including China, Russia, India and Brazil (the BRICs). Kosovo remains, therefore, a contested state in international politics.
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This article examines why the unique case argument has been rejected by so many states and observers.
In doing so, it explains the deep-seated objections to self-determination in international politics before examining the specific case of Kosovo. As will be shown, the view that Kosovo is a unique case in international politics does not hold up to scrutiny. Each of the key arguments is open to challenge. At the same time, the decision by the United States and leading EU members to pursue independence for Kosovo has come to be seen as an unacceptable redefinition of international principles designed to extricate these countries from a "mess" of their own making, while denying other peoples the right to apply the same principles elsewhere. 5 The exact number is unclear as several claimed recognitions, such as Oman and Nigeria, are disputed.
For an analysis of the methods of, and problems relating to, recognition see Ker-Lindsay (2012) . 6 The term contested state is itself contested in International Relations. Other similar terms used include de facto-states, unrecognised states and, confusingly, quasi-states -a term that is more usually used to describe recognised states that have ceased to function effectively as states.
Statehood and secession in international politics
Any territory wishing to gain recognition should first meet the formal attributes of statehood. These were laid down in the Montevideo Convention as follows: it must have a defined territory, a settled population, effective governance and the means to enter into relations with other states. 7 Although the Montevideo Convention provides important guidance as to the key features of statehood, and thus help to provide a basic -but non-binding -framework as to whether a territory or entity should be recognised as a state, other factors also play an important role in the process of recognition or the decision not to recognise. The way in which a state emerges has also become, at least since the middle of the twentieth century, extremely important. As Fabry (2010, p.9) notes, "since the 1950s, the determining factor in admission of new members into the society of states has been whether an entity has a prior right to independence, rather than whether it is independent." For instance, territories that meet the criteria of a state but have been created through acts of aggression are widely considered to be illegitimate. 8 But the use of force in the process of state creation is by no means the only consideration.
There are also other vital factors that play a decisive role in shaping the decision of a state whether or not to recognise an entity as a state. In the modern era, and especially since the end of the Second World War, perhaps the most powerful of these is the injunction against recognising states that have come about through unilateral acts of secession from an established and recognised state.
Underlying this reluctance to recognise acts of secession is the principle that states shall respect the territorial integrity of one another. Traditionally, the call for the respect for territorial integrity of states is taken to be a prohibition of military action by one state against another. For example, article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations provides that: "All Members shall refrain in their 7 For a discussion of these principles see Crawford (2006, pp.45-89 Nations, 1970) . Likewise, the principle of territorial integrity has also formed the basis of key regional agreements. Most notably, it was enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act, which has played a seminal part in shaping peace and security in Europe (Helsinki Declaration, 1975) . Mutual respect by states for the territorial integrity of one another has therefore emerged as a bedrock principle of the modern international system -even if some (such as Clapham, 1998) have argued that there is a need to adopt a more flexible understanding of statehood in international politics that recognises a more subtle variance between entities. As Abdul Koroma, a judge of the International Court of Justice, has put it:
The truth is that international law upholds the territorial integrity of a State. One of the fundamental principles of contemporary international law is that of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States. This principle entails an obligation to respect the definition, delineation and territorial integrity of an existing State. According to the principle, a State exercises sovereignty within and over its territorial domain. The principle of respect for territorial integrity is enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and other international instruments. (Koroma, 2010, para.21) For obvious reasons of self-interest, states have proven to be extremely reluctant to challenge this principle (Fierstein, 2008; Weller, 2005) . The problem, however, is that the principle of territorial integrity runs into direct confrontation with another key principle of international politics: the right of self-determination of peoples. As with territorial integrity, this has been enshrined in many of the key In practice, however, this claim has come to be seen as having little validity when it comes to statehood. Despite the fact that the principle is explicitly recognised within the Charter of the United Nations, and has since been elucidated in international treaties and agreements, in reality its application has been very limited. Since the end of the Second World War, the notion of self-determination resulting in the creation of new states has been viewed extremely narrowly. Primarily, it has come to be regarded as a right applicable to cases of European decolonisation (Koskenniemi, 1994, p.241) , or to other limited cases where a territory is under military occupation. But even in the context of decolonisation, the right of self-determination has been understood to be applicable only at the point of 7 decolonisation or military withdrawal. Thus a new state created by an act of decolonisation is, from the very moment of its creation, subject to the very rights of protection that apply to other sovereign states.
In non-colonial settings the principle of self-determination has come to be regarded rather differently.
In these cases, it is seen as being wholly subordinate to the principle of territorial integrity. In this context, self-determination is not about a right to independence. Rather, self-determination has come to be more generally seen as a right to self-administration and self-governance within an existing state (Archibugi, 2003) . No matter how much a population may desire independence, and even if that decision is taken democratically, the general rule is that unilateral secession, as an act of selfdetermination, is a violation of the territorial integrity of a state and is therefore contrary to the international law. In a view that echoes the position of other observers, 10 Crawford states:
In international practice there is no recognition of a unilateral right to secede based on a majority vote of the population of a sub-division or territory, whether or not that population constitutes one or more "peoples" in the ordinary sense of the word. In international law, selfdetermination for peoples or groups within an independent state is achieved by participation in the political system of the state, on the basis of respect for its territorial integrity. (Crawford, 1997) This significance of this elevation of the principle of the territorial integrity of states over and above that of self-determination was clearly seen throughout the Cold War when a number of territories 10 Again, this prohibition on the right to secede was explicitly raised by Judge Koroma in the Kosovo ICJ case, when he stated: "International law does not confer a right on ethnic, linguistic or religious groups to break away from the territory of a State of which they form part, without that State"s consent, merely by expressing their wish to do so. To accept otherwise, to allow any ethnic, linguistic or religious group to declare independence and break away from the territory of the State of which it forms part, outside the context of decolonization, creates a very dangerous precedent. Indeed, it amounts to nothing less than announcing to any and all dissident groups around the world that they are free to circumvent international law simply by acting in a certain way and crafting a unilateral declaration of independence, using certain terms." (Koroma, 2010, para.4 Pakistan"s military defeat by India and its decision to withdraw its forces from the territory (see Musson, 2008) . But even in this case, Bangladesh was only admitted to the UN after it was recognised by Pakistan, in 1974 (Fabry, 2010, p.5 ).
Although the principle of self-determination leading to independence came to be narrowly defined in Even, the independence of Eritrea and East Timor, the two non-European states that emerged in the period, did little to challenge the accepted norms of state formation. This was for two reasons. In the first instance, both were granted independence by the parent state. Secondly, again in both cases, the formal claim of the parent state had in any case been somewhat suspect. Both Eritrea and East Timor had been separate colonies prior to becoming part of Ethiopia and Indonesia respectively. In this sense, it could be argued that their right to external self-determination, to full independence, had in fact been curtailed. Therefore, neither could truly be regarded as a case of unilateral or even contested secession (McGarry, 2002, p.ix) .
Thus the end of the Cold War, while apparently creating challenges to notions of sovereignty and territorial integrity, actually served to reinforce the traditional views on secession. As Crawford (1998, p.114) has noted, states are still reluctant to recognise new states formed outside of the colonial experience: "this practice has not changed since 1989, despite the emergence during that period of 22 new states. On the contrary, the practice has been powerfully reinforced." Although some have called for the right to self-determination leading to independence to be extended beyond the colonial states, 10 answer is that this was in fact the original intention. As noted already, the break up of Yugoslavia led to a clear-cut acceptance of the right of the six formal republics to gain formal independence. However, this right was not extended to other units, namely Kosovo and Vojvodina, both of which were defined as autonomous provinces under the 1974 Yugoslav constitution, or to the constituent nations and nationalities within Yugoslavia. Throughout most of the 1990s, there was little wish to tackle the question of Kosovo, which became seen as an internal Yugoslav matter. This remained the case even though the Kosovo Albanians lobbied heavily for the question to be considered as part of the Dayton peace process, which led to the resolution of the conflict in Bosnia (Clark, 2001, p.65) .
It was as a result of this opposition on the part of the international community to consider Kosovo"s claim to statehood that prompted a number of Kosovo Albanians to break with the peaceful attempts to gain independence -an effort led by Ibrahim Rugova -and instead turn to violent methods. Thus the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) came into existence (for more on the emergence of the KLA see Perritt, 2008 and Pettifer, 2012) . Over the course of 1996 and 1997, the KLA gradually built up its forces, aided in large part by political instability in neighbouring Albania, which allowed large quantities of arms to cross the border. By the start of 1998, the violence in the province was starting to In early 1999, the conflict in Kosovo took a drastic turn for the worse following the discovery of a number of bodies in the small Kosovo hamlet of Račak. As a result, a peace conference was convened in the French town of Rambouillet, just outside Paris. There the two sides were forced to negotiate over a proposed plan to end the fighting in the province. In the end, however, no final agreement was reached. The Yugoslav government, led by Slobodan Milošević refused to accept a protocol of the agreement that would allow NATO forces free access across the entire territory of his country (Judah, 2002, p.220 
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The problem was that this formulation was wholly unacceptable to the Kosovo Albanians. As far as they were concerned, the NATO intervention had opened the way for independence. frustration at the lack of status could no longer be ignored. However, it also became all too apparent that there was absolutely no way in which they would accept any solution that would see Kosovo remain a part of Serbia, no matter how loosely this relationship would be defined. Indeed, any attempt to do so would be vigorously resisted. This raised the all too real prospect that should a solution short of statehood be foisted upon the Kosovo Albanian population, international forces and administrators could come to be regarded in the same way as Serb forces once were: as an occupying colonial power.
Kosovo would thus return to violence, this time aimed at the countries that had, just a few years earlier, fought for the liberation of those who had now turned against them. 21 As Daniel Fried, the US Undersecretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, put it with regard to discussions over the status process: "wavering would lead to disaster, beginning with riots by Kosovars that risked turning KFOR into an occupying force and could led to the very radicalization we had successfully avoided so far." 22 The implications of such a radicalisation on Western public opinion would be catastrophic. How could policy makers explain to their populations why people they had fought to protect had turned on them? 23 Given that any attempt to simply abandon the province would lead to anarchy and a power 20 As one leading political figure stated, the Kosovo Albanian leadership, "understood that Serbia cannot just get out, and the process of independence for Kosovo cannot be initiated without the presence of NATO, the EU, and the OSCE. A Western protectorate, and later independence through a referendum, is the national strategy of the Albanians of Kosova" (Shala, 2000, p.187 Kosovo a right to independence is that it clearly neglects the fact that international jurists had already specifically addressed this issue and found that it had not. As noted earlier, the Badinter Commission had expressly stated that the right of independence lay with the republics. The Commission did not extend this out to the two key autonomous provinces that sat on the federation council alongside the republics: Kosovo and Vojvodina. Secondly, and as also highlighted earlier, western policy makers deliberately sought to keep an independent Kosovo off the agenda throughout the 1990s when Yugoslavia was collapsing. Indeed, no one had an appetite for an independent Kosovo even after the NATO intervention. Therefore, it was only when it was obvious that the Kosovo Albanians would not accept anything less than independence that the argument that it held a special position within Yugoslavia that entitled it to independence, rather than a return to autonomy, emerged as a key element in the argument. It was therefore quite clearly created to serve a specific political need. Thirdly, if
Kosovo has a right to independence on these grounds, then surely that right must surely extend also to 29 See, inter alia, "Kosovo case unique, says Miliband", BBC News, 19 February 2008; "The Case for
Kosovo", US State Department (Last accessed 11 January 2010). 30 The preamble of the declaration states, inter alia, "Observing that Kosovo is a special case arising from Yugoslavia"s non-consensual breakup and is not a precedent for any other situation".
Vojvodina, which also enjoyed the same status as Kosovo within the SFRY. However, the international community has roundly rejected this view.
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Moreover, this line of reasoning also has wider ramifications for ethnic conflicts and peace process elsewhere. If a right to independence can be based on the existence of a particular administrative structure that does not have a notional right to sovereignty under the constitution of a state, then it raises the possibility that other sub-state units will in future declare that they too had enough of a special status as to merit formal independence.
The consequences of human rights abuses
The argument that Kosovo"s independence is permitted on the grounds of human rights violations has also been cited as a primary justification for Kosovo"s right to secede from Serbia (European Parliament, 2008 (Vidmar, 2010) . As Sir Ivor Roberts (2007) , the former British Ambassador in Belgrade, stated, "It is hard to explain to Serbs why, when Milošević was still in power, a settlement was imposed which left Kosovo legally and formally part of Serbia. But having overthrown Milošević and lived according to the rules of the international community for the last seven years, the Serbs now face being punished by losing nearly 20 per cent of their territory."
The period of UN administration
The third argument cited to justify statehood is that Kosovo has been under international administration for a prolonged period of time (European Parliament, 2008) . According to this line of reasoning, the lengthy period Kosovo had spent as an international protectorate had made any attempt to return it to
Belgrade"s rule, no matter how loose this rule might be, impossible. Kosovo therefore had no option but to go its own way. This line of reasoning is problematic for several reasons. For a start, even under UN administration, Kosovo had been recognised as Serbian territory. Belgrade simply had had no effective control over the province. To this extent, a model of autonomy could quite easily provide the same level of self-rule, while allowing Serbia to maintain nominal sovereignty over the province.
Indeed, the Serbian government frequently called for a solution based on, "more than autonomy, but less than independence", and suggested that it would be willing to accept Kosovo having significant external relations, including membership of the World Bank and IMF, and separate representation in sporting and cultural bodies. To this extent, it was unclear why UN administration had made Kosovo"s case for independence, rather than autonomy, so strong.
36 Paddy Ashdown, comments made during an interview on Sky News, 9 December 2007. Another observer put the case more harshly: "Fault for the war, originally, lies with local actors on the ground.
However, fault for this perverse non-peace and for much of the nonsense that has prevailed within it belongs to the international actors who waged a war without the guts to dictate clear terms afterwards" (Jansson, 2007) .
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A far more problematic element of this argument was the implications that this would have on attempts to manage conflicts elsewhere. If it were the case that Kosovo should have a right to independence on the basis of UN administration, it would make any future efforts to introduce UN administration in other conflicts that much harder to achieve. This argument was specifically tackled by the Cypriot delegation participating at the hearings of the International Court of Justice on the legality of Kosovo"s unilateral declaration of independence. In their oral presentation, the team stated:
What hope is there that States will be persuaded to accept international administration or other interim arrangements for dealing with crises of the kind that arose in the Balkans, if they know that they risk being told that the powers that they have temporarily shared with, or temporarily lent to, another body, have been irrevocably taken from them? It is like handing a child to someone to look after for a while; and then being told that you will never have the child back.
What will that do to efforts in the United Nations, or the African Union, or the OSCE to bring an end to killing and to find peaceful settlements to international problems? (ICJ, CR 2009/29, p.45) As an aside to this, it is perhaps worth noting that, in the context of the ICJ"s consideration of the legality of Kosovo"s declaration of independence, the Cypriot delegation also produced the strongest rationale as to why the judges should not seek to engage with the unique case argument during the course of their deliberations:
If the Court were once to say that it could in effect suspend the operation of the law in relation to one case because of its particular characteristics, it would establish, in the clearest possible terms, a precedent for suspending the operation of the law in relation to any case because of its particular characteristics…Moreover, it is unlikely that the Court could confine the effect of its opinion to the specific case of Kosovo. Some of the characteristics which have been alleged in statements before the Court to lead to the conclusion that Kosovo is a sui generis case exempt from the application of international law could in the hands of any skilful advocate or manipulative politicians be generalized so as to be applicable to many other situations…If the Court were to base its opinion on a characterization of Kosovo as a situation sui generis, it would cease to be a court of law and would take on the role of the other principal organs of the United Nations -that of deciding how a particular situation should be handled politically. (ICJ, CR2009/29, p.49)
Other occasionally cited elements of the unique case argument
In addition to the three primary reasons for claiming that Kosovo is a unique case, several other factors have been put forward. For example, another justification that has often been cited as a reason for
Kosovo"s right to independence is that this is the overwhelming wish of the people of Kosovo. This was explicitly raised by the United States in its oral presentation before the ICJ (CR 2009/30, p.23 ). It has not, however, been frequently cited by others as a justification for its independence as it so obviously rests on the self-determination argument that is being avoided at all costs by many other countries. If Kosovo"s unique character were to be based on the will of a dominant ethnic group, it would all but ensure that the majority of the international community would remain steadfastly opposed to recognition. Likewise, the argument that Security Council Resolution 1244 did not explicitly prohibit independence, a point stressed by many interested parties (such as Britain, the United States and Slovenia) in their oral presentations before the ICJ, 37 is also likely to have a disruptive effect. In future more care will have to be taken in the drafting of resolutions specifically to preclude certain undesirable outcomes on the part of certain interested actors. This will inevitably make drafting such resolutions that much more difficult and may well ensure that an element of constructive ambiguity, so necessary when trying to engage in peace processes, is removed. This could potentially serve to prolong armed conflict.
The sum of the parts argument
Leaving aside the shortcomings of the various individual arguments that have been put forward to claim that Kosovo is a unique case, it is also important to consider whether the sum of the whole is greater than the sum of the parts. According to this view, while each individual element is perhaps not a reason for regarding Kosovo as sui generis, when taken together they represent a powerful 37 In contrast, Russia, China, Brazil and Argentina, all of which were on the Security Council in 1999, and were involved in the deliberation over 1244, argue that the resolution is quite clear in reaffirming the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia and thus precluded independence as a final status.
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justification of this perspective. Obviously, there are problems with this line of reasoning. For a start,
given that each of the individual arguments can be challenged and proven to be either false or have a wider destabilising effect, combining them all together does not suddenly make them all right or acceptable. Secondly, two of the arguments -namely those relating to human rights abuses and UN administration -would apparently almost always run hand-in-hand. One does not have international administration, at least in the context being described here, in situations where all is fine and well. The existence of the latter is therefore a direct consequence of the former. Likewise, it is perfectly conceivable that in many other circumstances the removal of some degree of autonomy could be a justification for insurrection against the central government that sets in train the latter developments. In this sense, Kosovo certainly cannot be seen as unique in and of itself. To be sure, it may be unique inasmuch as it is perhaps the first time we have seen the confluence of these various factors in a particular situation. This does not, however, mean that it can be presented as existing within some sort of legal bubble that sets it against any other case that is likely to arise in the future. This brings us to the next element of the sui generis argument.
The unique case argument and a right to independence
While there are good reasons to cast doubt on each of the elements of the sui generis argument as a justification for statehood, it is important to note that the concept of a "unique case" has not rejected out of hand by many states. Indeed, a number of countries facing separatist threats of their own have been willing to accept that Kosovo is sui generis, if only to ensure that a link cannot be made to the specific circumstances that they face. For instance, all five of the EU member states that still reject Kosovo"s independence, 38 were willing to agree to a joint text produced at the time of the declaration of This is a question for them to ask of themselves and it is they who will give their own clear answer. It is not for Russia or any other country to answer this question for them. This is something that must take place in strict accordance with international law. Though, over these last years international law has given us numerous very complicated cases of peoples exercising their right to self-determination and the emergence of new states on the map. Just look at the example of Kosovo. (The Kremlin, 2008) As far as Russia was concerned, Kosovo would not, and could not, be sui generis.
Conclusion
For sixty years, the international community has sought to regulate and limit the right of selfdetermination. Rather than allow peoples to secede from established states, the argument has been made that self-determination should, except in limited cases associated with processes of decolonisation, be defined in terms of autonomy and self-government within existing states. This thinking applied as much to Kosovo as to any number of territories within states that sought to break away and gain full independence. The problem was that the decision to intervene in 1999 made a continuation of this policy untenable. While there was certainly a wish that Kosovo would be able to remain a part of Serbia, albeit with a very high degree of self-rule, this became all but impossible to achieve. To have tried to do so would have led to renewed violence. Likewise, any attempt to try to ignore the problem was doomed to failure. Rather than be seen as saviours, NATO and the UN administration in the province ran the risk of becoming seen as "occupiers". Under these circumstances, it became clear in many western capitals that the only solution was to let Kosovo declare independence and recognise it as such. However, realising that this would open the way for other groups to claim independence, it was claimed that Kosovo could not be a precedent. It was, instead, a unique case deriving from a unique set of conditions.
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The problem is that this argument failed to gain universal, let alone general, international support.
Taken separately, each of the key argument used to justify the unique case of Kosovo is subject to challenge. Taken together, even if Kosovo does represent a hitherto unseen coming together of various factors, these factors do not create a justification for setting aside the principles and norms of international relations in entirety. Moreover, many states have come to regard the argument as a means by which the West is trying to extricate itself from a mess of its own making, while preventing other states from being able to apply the same rationale in circumstances of their own. In other words, it was perceived as a case of the West creating one rule for itself while demanding that everyone else continue to follow established principles.
For all these reasons, it hardly seems surprising that the unique case argument failed to gain universal acceptance on the world stage and open the way for Kosovo"s full integration into the international community. Although the political rationale for supporting independence may have been sound, the arguments presented to justify the decision were flawed; not only in terms of the long-standing prohibition against secession, but also in terms of the consequences that they would have on peace processes elsewhere. Moreover, it was simply too easy for other powers, most notably Russia, to present the unique case argument as an example of Western hypocrisy. Lastly, many countries simply felt uncomfortable with the claim that Kosovo was not a precedent. By accepting that Kosovo was a unique case, the way would be opened for other "unique cases" to emerge in the future according to circumstances. As Timothy Garton Ash (2008) neatly put it at the time Kosovo declared independence, "Kosovo is unique, and there will be more Kosovos."
